Journal of Technology Law & Policy
Volume 18

Issue 1

Article 3

June 2013

Intellectual Property and Agriculture: The Case on Soybeans and
Monsanto
Marcelo Dias Varella

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jtlp

Recommended Citation
Dias Varella, Marcelo (2013) "Intellectual Property and Agriculture: The Case on Soybeans and Monsanto,"
Journal of Technology Law & Policy: Vol. 18: Iss. 1, Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jtlp/vol18/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Technology Law & Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

ESSAYS
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND AGRICULTURE:
THE CASE ON SOYBEANS AND MONSANTO
Marcelo Dias Varella

.........................................

59

I.

INTRODUCTION

II.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SEEDS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW.....................................62

III.

THE MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PATENTS AND PLANT
....................
VARIETIES PROTECTION FOR FARMERS

65

IV.

THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK .......................

67

V.

PATENTS RIGHTS ON GENES AND PLANTS THROUGH
LAWSUITS AND UNIONIST PRIVILEGE .......................

69

VI.

THE AGREEMENTS WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADERS BASED ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS...........................72

VII. AGREEMENTS WITH COMPETENT SEED COMPANIES ...........

73

VIII. THE EXTENSION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
THROUGH AGREEMENTS DIRECTLY WITH FARMERS ...........

IX.

THE LEGAL BATTLE AMONG EUROPEAN IMPORTERS,
FARMERS, AND MONSANTO: THE FALL LIKE A
HOUSE OF CARDS........................................77

X.

CONCLUSIONS

..........................................

75

81

I. INTRODUCTION

Developing countries had to implement intellectual property rights
on agriculture after the creation of the World Trade Organization
*

Professor of the University Center of Brasilia (UNICEUB). Email: marcelodvarella@
gmail.com.
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(WTO) in 1995. The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights agreement (TRIPS agreement), one of the WTO's treaties,
requires members to adopt an effective mechanism to protect plants
either by patents or a sui generis system.' I contend that developing
countries have institutional weaknesses, which allow multinational
companies to dominate their markets using intellectual property rights,
even when these countries do not accept their patents. The ability for
companies to extend their market share through such legal strategies is
increased by the complexity of patent law (mainly in new legal areas,
such as agriculture), the lack of knowledge among actors within the
production chain and/or among judges deciding the hard cases, and the
long timeline to conclude court cases in developing countries.
Additionally, I outline how applying intellectual property rights to
seeds, which in some cases was conceived to stimulate innovation, 2
results in some of the seed companies controlling the international
market. This observation is true regardless of which legal system is
chosen to ensure the protection, patent or the less extensive
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV).
Indeed, in some cases, the control exerted by intellectual property
rights is sufficient to dominate the national exportation market and
therefore affects the world market. 3 The sufficiency of the intellectual
property rights' control is evident, particularly in markets characterized
by the existence of an international debate on consumers' rights to
choose their food, such as genetically modified (GM) soybeans.4 In
these cases, the domination of productive markets results in
considerable restrain in the production and, therefore, exportation of
soybeans that are not genetically modified. This constriction eliminates
1. TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27
para. 4, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
Members may also exclude from patentability: ( ... ) (b) plants and animals
other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological
processes. However, Members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties
either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by any combination
thereof.
Id. art. 27(3).
2.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION:

A HANDBOOK FOR BEST PRACTICES 10 (Anatole Krattiger ed., 2007) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN

HEALTH AND

INNOVATION].

3. Id. The control over the biggest exports has a direct impact on the control over the
global market.
4. Thomas Bernauer & Philipp Aerni, Trade Conflict Over Genetically Modified
Organisms,in HANDBOOK ON TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT 183 (Kevin Gallagher ed., 2008).

20131

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND AGRICULTURE: THE CASE ON SOYBEANS AND MONSANTO

61

the possibility of choice for consumers and agents of the importing
countries.5
I intend to support these assertions through a case study. I
demonstrate how one enterprise, Monsanto, increased its market share
of the Brazilian production of soybeans and then dominated this market
for more than ten years by using arguments of intellectual property
rights in national courts. Monsanto filed patents on genes related to soy
beans. Either the Brazilian National Institute of Intellectual Property
(INPI) denied these patents or other companies contested them in the
courts. Because most national courts are not fully knowledgeable on
intellectual property law, the lawsuits took many years to resolve.
During this period, Monsanto was able to create a complex network
of contracts based on legally disputed patents and the protection of
varieties of plants. Monsanto's domination of the national market was
delayed because the national judiciary and actors within the production
chain in developing countries (such as Brazil) did not fully understand
the technicalities of intellectual property law. 6
However, as we shall see, in some cases this strategy backfires. I
intend to criticize this strategy and illustrate its limitations over time.
After ten years and many legal decisions, Monsanto could lose arguably
the most important case in intellectual property rights today. While the
popular 2012 case between Apple and Samsung resulted in
compensations of $1.05 billion.7 Monsanto's case could reach $3.5
billion in compensations. Because Brazil is one of the world's largest
exporters of soybeans, 9 it is also an important market for studying
intellectual property rights on seeds.
This Article is divided into various parts: first, a summary of the
international legal framework related to intellectual property and seeds.
Second, the principle legal and economic differences between the
State's two main legal possibilities: plant variety protection and patents.
5. See Michel Fok & Marcelo Varella, Evolution Rules for the Use of Transgenic Soy in
Brazil: An Analysis by a Systemic Approach to Governance, 27 Pot'Y & PUB. MGMNT. 3-34
(2010).
6. Cotricampo v. Monsanto Trial, 088/1.04.001125-7 before the House of Campo Novo,
Challenge the Process, item 127 [hereinafter Challenge the Process].
Miyoung Kim, Samsung to Add iPhone 5 to US. Lawsuits vs. Apple, REUTERS, Sept. 20, 2012,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/20/us-samsung-apple-idUSBRE88JOH520
120920.
8. Id.; Challenge the Process, supra note 6. There are different figures for the amount of
indemnification. First, there was a strong variation on the exchange rate between the U.S. Dollar
and the Brazilian Real. Second, there is 1% per month interest rate plus inflation, which could
add more than 20% per year. Third, only Monsanto has the precise numbers of whom and how
much was paid in the last years.
9. Justino De La Cruz & David Riker, ProductSpace Analysis of the Exports of Brazil,
18 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Office of Econ., Working Paper No. 2012-06-A, 2012).
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Third, a presentation of the Brazilian legal framework to demonstrate a
possible outcome even if Brazil did not accept patents on seeds or
patents on genes, but only plant variety protection. Fourth, the
Monsanto legal strategy of making Brazil accept patents on plants and
genes. Fifth, the top-to-bottom agreements with traders based on
intellectual property rights. Sixth, the agreements with competent seed
companies. Seventh, the agreements with warehouses, cooperatives, and
individual farmers based on the creation of an effective database and the
presumption of the validity of those intellectual property rights. Eighth,
the farmers' reactions in European and Brazilian Courts, which
demonstrate how fragile this strategy could be, based on the decision
that results in billions of dollars in compensations against Monsanto.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SEEDS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

Brazil edited a law on intellectual property rights on
biotechnological innovations just after the creation of the WTO, as a
consequence of the TRIPS agreement.' 0 In regard to intellectual
property rights on plant varieties, TRIPS grants the Member States the
right to choose their own intellectual property rights system: UPOV or
patents." Most developing countries have chosen the UPOV system,
which is considered the more favorable system to farmers and national
seed companies.12 At the time, due to the diversity in seed companies
and, even more significantly, the number of farmers acting on their
classic property right to sow the products of their harvests,' 3 the impact
of adopting one type of intellectual property on seeds did not seem to be
significant.14 Following this logic, the legislators approved a rule of
intellectual property that hinders the protection through patents, giving
the intellectual property holders the minimum of rights compatible with
TRIPS.' 5
10. Lei No. 9.279, de 15 de Maio de 1996, Industrial Property Law, May 1996 (Braz.).
The TRIPS agreement entered inforce in January 1, 1995. TRIPS, supra note 1. Another law,
the Plant Variety Protection Act, created a sui generis protection for plant varieties. Lei No.
9.456, de 25 de Abril de 1997, Plant Variety Protection Act, Sept. 1997 (Braz.).
11. TRIPS, supra note 1.
12. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants [UPOVI,
Members of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (2012),
http://www.upov.int/members/en/pdf/pub423.pdf.
13. Jeremy F. DeBeer, Reconciling PropertyRights in Plants, 8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP.
5, 6 (2005).
14. Id.
15.
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Intellectual property rights is a branch of law distinguished by the
high level of legal techniques required and the significant economic
interests involved. Among the major countries that are creators of
technology, the impetus is frequently given by the United States,
whether because of its jurisprudence development or by its analyses
guidelines.' 6 European and Japanese law tend to follow the NorthAmerican legal framework.' 7 The innovating countries stimulate the
development of the fields of patent rights due to the evolution of
technology, as demonstrated by the introduction of the patentability of
living organisms with the proliferation of biotechnologies.'" In this
process, the United States and Japan decided the patentability of plants
and genes, and, specifically for the United States, the patentability of
plant varieties. Moreover, the approaches are different since companies
make American farmers pay rates each year for the usage of patented
genes. On the other hand, Europe forbids the patentability of plant
varieties and has a legal system that is more favorable to the farmers
who benefit from the right to plant by paying a much lower contribution
to the patent-holder.' 9
At the international negotiation at the WTO, the innovating countries
succeeded in approving a common basis regarding the patentability of
the introduction of every invention in all technological areas. In relation
to living organisms, innovators may patent genetically modified
microorganisms, but States remain free to reject the patent on plants and
animals. However, there is the necessity to envisage, for the plant
varieties, an intellectual property right that can be sui generis but that
needs to be efficient.2 0
As there is nothing mentioning the patentability of the genes, two
interpretations are possible. Innovating countries in biotechnology
consider genes a chemical molecule, independent of the plant or animal
it affects and, therefore, patentable. Other countries consider the genes
solely as a part of the plant, and therefore not patentable.21 Because
plants are nothing but a combination of DNA sequences, plants must be
patentable because a patent on genes represents an indirect patent on
14.05.1996 (NEw PATENT LAW)

(1996)

[hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EMERGING

SECTORS].

16.

See, e.g., Eileen Kane, Patenting Genes and Genetic Methods: What's at Stake?, 6 J.

Bus. & TECH. L. 1 (2010).
17.

MARCELO DIAS VARELLA ET AL.,

INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT

(2005).
18.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EMERGING SECTORS, supra note 15.

19.
(2009).
20.

Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 34 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 465, 534

21.

MARIE ANGELE HERMITTE, PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES AND THE LAW IN THE NORTH-

TRIPS, supra note 1.

SOUTH REPORT (2004).
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plants. 22
Gene patents are models of intellectual protection that are more
sophisticated than plant patents. 2 3 In the United States, plants are
actually patentable as one object.24 In order to allow different holders to
have patents on the same plant for different functional characteristics,
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, after discussing the matter in
court, authorized the patent of plant genes. 25 Thus, every different
genetic sequence gives the right to a new patent, like a machine with
different parts. For instance, a plant can be subject to a patent on the
DNA sequence to resist the cold, another one on faster growth, and a
third one for the resistance to an herbicide. In other words, gene
patentability allows not only for plant patentability, but also for the
addition of several patents on the same plant for each new genetic
sequence.2 6
According to TRIPS, the obligation to accept patents on genes would
be a threat to the absolute freedom to exclude patents on plants and
animals. 27 The choice of gene patentability is not, therefore, a technical
choice mandatory according to TRIPS, but a political choice of each
country. Additionally, this multilateral treaty contains an important
number of subjective expressions that leave room for different
interpretations within the judicial hermeneutic of the member countries
of the WTO.
This national discretion is the result of arduous negotiation during
the treaty-making process. The countries that do not significantly
innovate can thus choose, to some extent, to adapt their legal framework
to their interests. Accordingly, the interests of the biggest worldwide
agricultural producers and innovators rarely converge. The biggest
agricultural producers, such as Brazil, Argentina, Australia, China, New
Zealand, and India (still very timid innovators) want lenient intellectual
property laws on their products so they can use genetically modified
plants without paying excessive rates. These countries do not wish to
use patented technologies, primarily to avoid exchanging currencies
linked to the payment of rates for the licenses used.28
22.
23.
24.

See Yu, supra note 19.
Id.
Jim Chen, The Parableof the Seeds: Interpretingthe Plant Variety Protection Act in

FurtheranceofInnovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105, 121-22 (2005).

25. See generally Jeremy F. DeBeer, The Rights & Responsibilities of Biotech Patent
Owners, 40 U.B.C. L. REv. 343 (2007).
26. Andrew W. Torrance, Intellectual Property as the Third Dimension of GMO
Regulation, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 257, 279 (2007).
27.

See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND INNOVATION, supra note

2, at 48.
28. Jeffrey Sachs, A New Map of the World, ECONOMIST, July 22, 2000, http://www.
economist.com/node/80730.
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Thus, international law gave countries the right to choose between
two systems of intellectual property on plants: patents and variety
protection. The differences between the patents on seeds and genes from
plant varieties coincide with national legal and political choices.
III. THE MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PATENTS AND PLANT
VARIETIES PROTECTION FOR FARMERS

Plants have a specific intellectual property system protection that
allows the rights holder to control their commercialization. However,
this control is not as encompassing as the protection for plants and DNA
sequences that patents would provide. The majority of countries use the
specific (sui generis) system, as determined by TRIPS.29 European
countries accept protection by plant patents not set in the vegetable
variety mode. This is unlike the United States, which provides a double
protection by both systems for the same vegetable variety. 30
The seeds sector earned a specific system due to the characteristics
of the protected objects. Unlike other inventions, such as machines and
computer software, living beings reproduce themselves naturally. The
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants
(UPOV) is an international organization linked to the World Intellectual
Property Organization that manages intellectual property ri hts of plant
varieties. Both organizations work in the same building. Similar to
patents, the UPOV system has as a principle that farmers do not have to
pay for each proliferation of protected plants. Rather, the farmers pay in
a specific and less expensive way, with each country having
implemented a different system of equitable reward in favor of the
rights holder. 32
The systems also differ in the criteria and time of protection. With
patent protection, scientific research on the patented object will often be
permitted with the authorization of the rights holder. With UPOV
protection, not only is the research possible without authorization of the
rights holder, but new resulting plant varieties are also permitted as long
as the plant variety obtained is different from the previous one. With
patent protection, the period of protection is twenty years, while with
29.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN HEALTH AND INNOVATION, supra note 2,

at 59.
30. See Jay P. Kesan & Mark D. Janis, Intellectual Property Protection for Plant
Innovation: Unresolved Issues After J.E.M. v. Pioneer, (111.Pub. Law & Theory Research Paper
No. 03-01, 2003) (showing that the case was rediscussed in the United States after J.E. v.
Pioneer).
3 1. See UPOV, What It Is, What It Does, UPOV Pub. No. 437 (Jan. 5, 2013).
32. See UPOV, UPOVCONVENTIONOF 1978 art. 5, Oct. 23, 1978.
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UPOV protection the duration can vary according to the species. The
criteria to grant the rights are also distinct. With patent protection, the
object must be new, have inventive activity, and be likely to be inserted
in an industrial process. On the other hand, in order to be protected by
the UPOV, the plants must be homogeneous, stable, and different from
other known plants. 33
The two forms of protection also have different gains on investments
as patent protection allows for more accessible gains. In fact, in the
agricultural field, farmers buy their seeds and in some countries, they
produce their own seeds without having to pay for them again. In
Europe, a farmer can do this; however, he needs to pay an "equitable
contribution" to the rights holder. Nevertheless, if there is a seed patent,
for each new crop, farmers have to pay royalties according to the
amount harvested. That is, the return on one patented seed occurs
multiple times, regardless of whether or not the farmer returned to the

seed market. 34
Under the UPOV system, farmers can acquire new seeds for free,
except in some regions and countries in Europe that charge a mandatory
equitable contribution. Moreover, farmers can use the seed that they
planted, but cannot sell it. Additionally, an important characteristic of
the protective system of vegetable variety is that farmers generally
cannot charge for the sale of their grains. However, if the farmer
obtained the grain by evading the breeder's rights, that is, a) without
having paid for the seed when first acquired, or b) the subsequent
annual contributions (as indicated by the system), or c) more commonly
with the sales of seeds, then the farmer may charge for the sale of his or
her grains.35 Thus, if a plant is sold as a grain that is to be processed or
consumed by the target market and not as a reproductive material,
intellectual property rights prohibit the breeder from interfering in their
commercialization. The rights of the patent holders are even more
meaningful for a patent of genetic sequences, as each genetic sequence
of the same plant could have a patent. The system also applies if the
original variety characteristic is lost (for instance, in the case of other
varieties crossing). If the patented genetic sequence is present in the
new plant, then the holder will have the rights on the crossed plant
because the genetic sequence continues in this new plant. 36
33. The criteria for protection under UPOV norms are different from patents. Plants must
be distinct from other plants, stable in different generations, and homogenous. There are also
different UPOV Conventions. Most countries adopt the 1978 Convention, while some others
follow the 1991 Convention, which accept also a cumulative protection with patents. Id.
34. Chen, supra note 24, at 125.
35. Max Stul Oppenheimer, The 'Reasonable Plant' Test: When Progress Outruns the
Constitution, 9 MINN. J.L. Sa. & TECH. 417, 427-28 (2008).

36.

See Chen, supra note 24, at 127.
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On this matter, the example of RR soybean from Monsanto is
interesting. In the United States, the resistant gene of the herbicide
Roundup Ready, manufactured by Monsanto, and the variety in which it
is inserted was patented. In Brazil, however, it is not the variety
produced by Monsanto that is commercialized, but another variety that
results from the natural crossing between the Monsanto variety and the
Brazilian soybean varieties (ironically called Maradonna seeds by
Brazilian farmers 37 ). However, in the final variety planted in Brazil,
there is the genetic sequence responsible for the resistance to the
herbicide, a patented sequence in the United States. When applying the
model of relative patentability solely on plant varieties, Monsanto's
rights could be guaranteed on the variety used in Argentina, for
example, but not on the variety used in Brazil. On the other hand, when
applying the model of DNA sequence patentability, Monsanto's rights
would be guaranteed on Brazilian varieties as well.
Thus, most innovators adopt patents because patents are more
profitable. Most countries adopt the patent system because their
international commitments require them to have some intellectual
property law.
IV. THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Brazil, which is one of the world's largest agricultural exporters,
adopts plant variety protection. In Brazil, the Law n.9.279 of 1996
regulates biotechnological inventions, in articles 10 and 18. The Law
establishes, a priori,the patentability of all inventions. Later, the law
defines what Brazil considers an invention, consequently excluding
everything not considered as an invention from patentability. Article 10
stipulates:
Does not consider as invention or utility model:
I - discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical methods;
X - all or part of natural living beings and biological material
found in nature, or isolated therefrom, including the genome or
germplasm of any natural living being and the natural biological

37. Vladmir Branddo & Jaime Luccas, The Advantages and Dangers of the Soybeans
'Maradona,' GLOBORU AL, available at http://revistagloborural.globo.com/GloboRural/0,6993,
EEC517911-1484-5,00.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
38. Lei No. 9.279, de 15 de Maio de 1996, Industrial Property Law, May 1996 (Braz.)
[hereinafter Industrial Property Law] art. 80.
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processes.39
Line I above is important because it excludes discoveries from
patentability. In the United States, the concept of discovery is
interpreted very differently than it is in Brazil. In the United States, for
instance, the simple isolation of chemical properties of a plant is enough
to consider the plant as no longer being pre-existent in nature, therefore
granting patent rights to those responsible for the isolation. 4 0
Line X is clearer concerning living beings. Living beings found in
nature are not considered inventions in their whole or in their parts.
Article 18 defines non-patentable matter. The legislature made a
political choice allowed by the TRIPS agreement that living beings or
parts of living beings are not patentable, with the exception of
transgenic microorganisms. Here, the expression "natural living being"
was abandoned, leading to the belief that every gene, whether from a
natural living being or not, is not patentable. To avoid inaccuracy in
what is considered a transgenic microorganism, the sole paragraph,
which was discussed at length during the legislative process, excludes
from patentability all or part of plants or animals. Thus, the sole
paragraph would exclude cells or plant genes, whether genetically
modified or not, presented in the shape of a microorganism from
patentability.41
According to Article 18:
Are not patentable:
III - all or part of living beings, except for transgenic
microorganisms which meet the three requirements of
patentability - novelty, inventive activity and industrial relevance
- foreseen in art. 80 and which is not a simple discovery.
Sole Paragraph. For the purposes of this Law, transgenic
microorganisms are organisms that, except the whole or part of
plants or animals, express through direct human interference in
its genetic structure, a feature that is normally not attained by the
species under natural conditions. 42
Article 18 complements Article 10, since the legal text does not
allow partial interpretation. A systemic interpretation clearly illustrates
that the law prohibits patents on genes, even when a human being
39.
40.
39 Hous.
41.
42.

Id. art. 10.
Jay P. Kesan & Mark D. Janis, U.S. Plant Variety Protection:Sound and Fury ...
L. REV. 727, 730 (2002).
See TRIPS, supra note 1.
Industrial Property Law, art. 18.
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performs a genetic modification on living beings, plants, animals, or a
part of them (plant stems, animal and human being organs, cell tissue,
or genes). These are not patentable objects, even if they result from
genetic engineering.
In 1997, one year after the patent law, Brazil published the law
n.9.456 on plant varieties protection. Article 2 clearly states:
Art. 2 The protection of intellectual property rights related to
plants varieties is carried out by awarding Certificate of Plant
Variety Protection, considered a commodity for all legal purposes
and it is the only form of protection ofplant varieties that by law
can inhibit the free use or reproduction of plants, parts ofplants
or vegetative propagation,in Brazil. 43
Even though Brazil chose to protect plants through plant varieties
protection, Monsanto was still able to enforce patents of plants and
genes through an interesting legal strategy involving national and
international actors.
V. PATENTS RIGHTS ON GENES AND PLANTS THROUGH
LAWSUITS AND UNIONIST PRIVILEGE

Monsanto initiated its activities in Brazil in 1930. However, for the
last 15 years, it has been increasing its investments to expand its
regional market dominance. In Brazil, Monstanto controls the firms
Monsanto Participag5es, Monsoy, and Monsanto Nordeste.4 Having
soybeans as its main export product, an important growth in their
benefits seems logical. The soybeans cultivated in other countries
results from public and private investments in technology for the past
fifty years, creating dozens of different varieties that adapt to the
different regional conditions of production of each country.
It is in this panorama that Monsanto gradually increased its
influence. First, it developed a control policy on the Brazilian
production of seeds by acquiring Brazilian firms that produce seeds. A
few years ago, Monsanto acquired the firm Agroceres, the biggest seed
producer in the country, and restructured the firm, creating Monsoy of
Brazil. Monsanto acquired many other firms and incorporated them into
the holding. By buying local competitors, Monsanto was able to
acquire, at the same time, their germplasm. Therefore, the genetic basis
43. Lei No. 9.456, de 25 de Abril de 1997, Plant Variety Protection Act, Sept. 1997
(Braz.) art. 2.
44. Challenge the Process, supra note 6. This information was given to SEAE by the
firm. Fok & Varella, supra note 5, at 4.
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adapted to the climate and adverse technologies, thus dominating the
production and evolution of soybeans in the Mercosul countries.
Therefore, it is important to understand Monsanto's strategy in
establishing its economic power in this legal context as being a priori,
an unfavorable one. In order to register its invention, Monsanto used the
pipeline system to make three requests to Instituto Nacional da
Propriedade Industrial (INPI) in 1996 and 1997, just after TRIPS and
the Brazilian law.4 5 The three patents are explicitly gene patents of
plants; the first patent is of chimerical genes. 46 The second is of a DNA
sequence to intensify the efficiency of the transcription. 47 The third
patent is of DNA construction to also enhance the transcription
efficiency. 48 The patent requests presented genes as a protein and not as
part of a living being. Therefore, it was a patentable chemical substance.
This patent request clearly distorts its content and contradicts Brazilian
laws that forbid the concession of patents on genes. 49
Monsanto, however, continued to demand patents for plants, seeds,
and genes at the INPI, a national institution equivalent to the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office. INPI continuously denied these patents because
of the regulatory prohibition. Notwithstanding, Monsanto's strategy
changed. Like other companies, Monsanto filed patents in the United
States, where those patents are accepted, and then asked for unionist
priority in Brazil.o Unionist priority guarantees the validity of the
patent around the world. Thus, even if the patent is not granted where it
was originally ordered, it does not restrain other countries from
accepting the patent. The first solicitant's priority guarantees the
patent's right during a reasonable amount of time, protecting the patent
from competitors. This way, even if the country of origin does not grant
the plant patent, competitors are prohibited from having patents on the
same object in other locations for the time necessary for other patent
offices to analyze it. In developing countries, this period could take
151
even longer.
Companies could use the institutional weaknesses of developing
countries to improve their rights, even when no rights existed. In Brazil,
the INPI needs an important period to analyze a biotech patent.
45.

CYNTHIA M. Ho, ACCESS TO MEDICINE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENTS ON PATENTS AND RELATED RIGHTS 225 (2011).

46. Braz. Patent Order P 11l00007-4, 06/08/1998.
47. Braz. Patent Order PI 1101067-3, 14/05/1997.
48. Braz. Patent Order PI 1101045-2, 14/05/1997.
49. Maria Thereza Wolff, Patenting Research, J. DO COMMERCIO (July 10, 2003),
available at http://www.dannemann.com.br/site.cfm?app=show&dsp=mtw6&pos=5.7&lng-pt
(last visited Apr. 10, 2013).
50. As seen in the invention orders PH 101069-0, P11101070-3, and P11101050-9.
51. See generally Robert Sherwood et al., Promotion of Inventiveness in Developing
Countries Through a More Advanced Patent Administration,39 IDEA: J.L. TECH. 473 (1999).
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Sometimes, this process takes many years during which time the patent
must be respected. Monsanto could enforce its rights that were granted
in the United States in Brazil. Monsanto could also improve its legal
rights through a series of agreements with farmers. Farmers only signed
those agreements because they believed there was a patent right that
obligated them to do so. When these patents were finally denied by
INPI, Monsanto initiated lawsuits, either contesting the INPI decision or
asking for patent extensions. Because the courts took five to ten years to
decide, the seed company enforced its rights for a period longer than
usual for a patent.
However, contradicting the evidence, the firm argued in the
instruction of the order of invention that the genes from the first patent
were not genes, but part of a non-natural biological process. Such a
determination would make the genes susceptible to a patent according
to the Brazilian Law 9.279/1996. The reasoning, inspired by the North
American doctrine, contradicted the Brazilian legislation.
The first invention request from 1996 was granted on August 6,
1998. INPI's decision clearly contradicted Brazilian legislation on
patents because it accepted the gene patents by recognizing the
insufficient rhetorical argumentation of Monsanto distinctly contrary to
the law. Nevertheless, a week later, competing companies Zeneca and
Nortox appealed through an administrative action, claiming INPI's
decision was not grounded. The administrative proceeding was put on
hold; in the meantime other companies filed a lawsuit battle in the
judiciary52 that has dragged out for more than 10 years as a result of
Monsantos' patent being nullified. During the lawsuit, Monsanto kept
its intellectual property rights. In other words, Monsanto was able to
keep for more than 10 years (almost half the length of a patent)
commercial exclusivity on a plant that should not be granted a patent in
Brazil. The lack of efficiency of INPI and of Brazil's Judiciary
engenders, therefore, important economic consequences for the costs of
agricultural production.
Some farmers' associations filed lawsuits against Monsanto.
However, Monsanto presented different patents and the provisionary
measures of INPI that supported them. Normally, judges would accept
those patents as valid and enforce Monsanto's rights, primarily because
either most of these farmers' associations did not present the real scope
of these patents, or the judges did not possess the expertise required to
understand the patents' legality and validity.
Thus, Monsanto was able to create patent rights in a legal scenario
that forbade them and assured the patent rights through different
lawsuits with legal injunctions that took more than a decade to be
52.

J.F.R.J.-6, Nortox & Zeneca v. Monsanto, Case 990063442-0 (Braz.).
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finally judged.

VI. THE AGREEMENTS

WITH INTERNATIONAL TRADERS BASED ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

If TRIPS offers the countries of the WTO the freedom in
patentability for some inventions in the field of the living, then this
freedom is limited to the territory of these countries. From the moment
the producers decide to export to countries where the patentability of
these inventions is recognized, it is this second option that will prevail.
Thus, Monsanto extended patents using its commercial power and
control on strategic markets.
The WTO guarantees to countries the sovereign freedom to grant a
varying level of rights to the holders of intellectual property rights.
However, embracing patents granted in Europe and in the United States
on plants, companies can control importation in territories where these
patents are recognized. In other words, the choice made by countries,
such as Brazil, to restrict several biotechnological inventions from
protection through patents, as allowed by the TRIPS agreement, is valid
in Brazilian territory. However, when Brazil decides to export soybeans
to another country, the importing compan can block imports based on
its rights guaranteed by the importer. Because most of Brazil's
soybeans are exported, the legal norms for importers in Brazil have
significant exterritorial effects.
In fact, the TRIPS agreement allows countries to give patent holders
the right to prohibit a patented product from entering their territory. 54
Thus, different countries can vary in the principle of rights exhaustion.
The rights of a patent holder are exhausted after the commercialization
in a country where royalties were paid. The product can circulate freely
in that country. If the importing country accepts the principle of rights
exhaustion, intellectual property rights holders in that country will not
be able to forbid imports. Many countries follow this principle. In fact,
Europe accepted rights exhaustion in its Unionist space.
The rights exhaustion of plant patenting is different because grain
exporters (cooperatives or firms) are not obligated to pay intellectual
property rights derivative of patents for the use of genetic material
53. Jay Erstling & Isabelle Boutillon, The Patent Cooperation Treaty: At the Center of
the InternationalPatentSystem, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1583, 1588 (2006).
54. TRIPS, supra note 1. This happens if there is no agreement from the rights holder and
if the country of origin gives the same intellectual property rights as the country of destination.
55.

WAGENINGEN UNIV. & RES. CENTRE, Centre for Genetic Res., The Neth., Breeding

Business: The Future ofPlant Breeding in the Light ofDevelopments in Patent Rights and Plant
Breeder'sRights Report 34, GN Rep. 2009-14 (Niels Louwaars et al. eds., 2009).
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patented in Europe. Nevertheless, the rights holder will have to act if the
product is imported into a country that recognizes plant patents or gene
patents. In this case, the patent holder's rights were not exhausted
because the product (i.e., soybean) was set in the Brazilian market
without patent protection and without the authorization and consent of
the patent holder. The holder will act, therefore, in the locale of the
importation.56 Man' of these decisions were. the object of discussion at
the European level.
Because Brazil exports such a large quantity of soybeans to Europe,
necessary to make agreements between the exporters, the
became
it
importers, and Monsanto. The agreements tried to compensate for losses
of intellectual property rights. In other words, a country may not foresee
the patentability of a product as long as it does not export to a country
that does foresee it. Considering the destination of most parts of soy
production, we can conclude that Brazil's freedom to legally choose to
constrict the patent rights on agricultural products is extremely
limited."
Thus, Monsanto could enforce its patents rights in Brazil using the
judiciary system and TRIPS's possibilities regarding the extension of
rights for global markets. In the first case, it was possible to create a
higher level of intellectual property rights protection at the institutional
level. In the second case, it was possible to control exports, normally
through other multinational companies (traders) acting in Brazil.
VII. AGREEMENTS WITH COMPETENT SEED COMPANIES

Monsanto and Brazilian seed companies can sign a commercial
contract that uses the gene of resistance in the varieties they offer on the
market. As set by the contract, the licensed company can use the
Monsanto gene and incorporate it into their varieties. In exchange, they
establish an agreement with farmers who buy seeds with the protected
gene stating that they would pay Monsanto a fee, referred to as the "rate
of use of technology." In turn, Monsanto would gather these fees and
56. Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Sesostris S.A.E., Case 488/07, The Case on Soybeans and
Monsanto, Decision of July 27, 2007 [hereinafter Case on Soybeans]; Monsanto Tech. LLC v.
Cargill Int'l SA [2007] EWHC 2257 (Pat); Case C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV,
2010 E.C.R. 1-6790; U.K. High Crt., Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cargill Int'l, Decision of Oct. 10,
2007.
57. Marcelo Dias Varella & Maria Marinho Pinto Edelvacy, Intellectual Property and
Export ofSoybean: Reflections from Experience ofArgentina and Brazil to Face Judged by the
European Courts, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INAGRICULTURE 223 (Charlene De Avila Plaza et

al. eds., 2011).
58. Bernard Remiche & Vincent Cassiers, Anti-Counterfeitingand North-South Transfer
Technologies: A Real Challenge, 23 INT'L J. ECON. L. 277-324 (2009).
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pass on 12.5% of the total gathered to the licensed firm. These
agreements could be made because other companies believed these
companies should pay for the gene patents, even if these patents were
the objects of a legal dispute.
At last, the agreement ensures that the licensed seed firms do not
have the right to insert other genes with rights belonging to competing
firms in a variety with the Monsanto gene, even if these other genes
would provide different characteristics. The standard agreement
determines that licensed firms cannot establish contracts with other
firms while simultaneously using the protected Monsanto gene. 59
Therefore, there cannot be two or more distinct technologies in the same
plant. The firm must choose between the Monsanto gene and the other
gene. Seeing the commercial success of the gene resistant to glyphosate,
competitors have not shown an interest in adding other genes.
Consequently, Monsanto's monopoly is strengthened with the
commercialization of a great part of the country's soybeans.
Contracts like this one were established with the firms FMT,
Unisoja, Coodetec, and Embrapa (Public Firm of Agricultural
Research). These deals enabled Monsanto to control 82.7% of the
national soybean production. Even though only a part of this soybean
contains the glyphosate resistant gene, it is thought that, in a short
period, almost all cultivated plants will contain the technology, thus
ensuring Monsanto's significant control over the entire seed

production. 60

Seed companies will likely not react negatively to this situation
because they cooperate with Monsanto. The seed companies can freely
sell their traditional seeds and can sell their own variety that contains
the gene Monsanto licensed to them that competes directly with their
traditional variety. However, because they receive a 12.5% rate on
technology, seed companies are induced to sell the genetically modified
seeds rather than their traditional seeds, because their profits are higher.
Besides the seed market, Monsanto gathered a third generation of
profits because the firm is also the biggest producer of glyphosate in
Argentina and Brazil. This herbicide considerably increased Monsanto's
market share compared to the number of farmers who use the resistant
soybean to this same herbicide. With the increased use of this soybean
variety, the use of herbicide also increased proportionally.61
59. Challenge the Process, supra note 6. This information was given to SEAE by the
firm. Fok & Varella, supra note 5, at 5.
60. Monsanto marketshare was only 18.70% in 2002. Competing companies: Embrapa
(27.98%), MGF (19.65%), Coodetec (16.37), Fepagro (2.27%), CTPA (1.64%), Bayer (1.37%).
Fok & Varella, supra note 5, at 11 tbl.1.
61. Brazil became one of the highest markets for agrochemicals, 773.9 tons in 2008 (in
the United States, it was 646 tons in the same year). See Interview by Patricia Fachin with Maria
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In March 2006, the Economic Defense Secretary ordered the
Competition Defense Council to analyze this subject.6 2 In a temporary
decision, the Council decided that Monsanto and its partners had to
change the exclusivity sections of their contracts to allow the addition of
other genes, therefore avoiding a soybean technological monopoly.
Consequently, Monsanto improved its market share on soybean
seeds substantially in a few years. However, its most difficult step was
to make every farmer respect Monsanto's patent rights and pay for the
soybeans. The main problem was that most of the soy planted in Brazil
was not bought from Monsanto. Instead, it was planted by the farmers
themselves, by cooperatives, or illegally brought from Argentina
without Monsanto control.
VIII. THE EXTENSION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
THROUGH AGREEMENTS DIRECTLY WITH FARMERS

Monsanto needed to control farmers. However, it was difficult to do
so. Because farmers did not buy their seeds from Monsanto, it was
impossible for Monsanto to discover who was using its technology or
not. Monsanto's first step was to start a control on the new seeds. Every
time a farmer bought new seeds from Monsanto or from one of its
associate companies, the farmer was obliged to sign an agreement on
the seed sale, which required the farmer to pay royalties to Monsanto. 63
Moreover, Monsanto could build an important database with names,
addresses, sizes of properties, and quantities of seeds bought by each
farmer.
The second step was to control all of the other farmers who produced
their own seeds. To do so, Monsanto created an ex post control. When
those other farmers tried to sell their seeds to a trader, the trader had an
agreement with Monsanto to test them and verify if the seeds were GM
seeds. In that case, the trader could only buy the seeds after a
compensation payment to Monsanto. In both cases, the payments were
based on the presumption that there were valid patents on the seed.6 4
Jose Guazzelli, Agronomist, Brazil, The Largest Consumer of Pesticides (June 8, 2009),
http://www.ecodebate.com.br/2009/06/09/brasil-o-maior-consumidor-de-agrotoxicos-entrevistaespecial-com-maria-jose-guazzelli/.
62. Challenge the Process, supra note 6; Fok & Varella, supra note 5.
63. "A cordo para Licenciamento de Tecnologia Roundup Ready" [Technology
Licensing Agreement for Roundup Ready], http://www.apsemg.com.br/imagens/File/Acordo%
20Geral%202009%20FINAL%20MIR%2024.07.09.pdf. See also Andressa De Sousa E. Silva,
System of Governance of Soybean Genetically Modifed and Principles Guiding Biosafety
(2008) (LLM dissertation, Centro Universitario de Brasilia) (on file with Centro Universitario
de Brasilia), availableat http://www.uniceub.br/pdflDissertacaoAndressa.pdf.
64. Varella & Edelvacy, supra note 57, at 227.
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Monsanto justified its right to ask for compensation as a consequence of
its patents.
For example, in Brazilian states such as Parana where control was
strict, the area planted with this soybean variety was rather small. At the
end of the harvest, when the illegal plantings were found, the Federal
Government exempted the farmers, instead of applying the punishments
proscribed by the law. 65 Consequently, production increased in the
following years, and again each year farmers were amnestied. This
continued until -the plantings of 2004-05, which reached 300 million
acres of glyphosate-resistant soybeans, when growing it was legally
authorized. In 2009, according to Monsanto and the agricultural
cooperatives of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, an estimated 90% of
soybean plantings in Rio Grande do Sul were genetically modified.6 6
After a few years, when it was not possible to avoid this variety of soy,
the government finally authorized it.6 7
At an inferior level, Monsanto also made deals with farmers'
cooperatives, consenting to a discount for those who control and
cooperate with the payment of royalties on its technology. According to
Monsanto, 6 8 it signed more than 300 contracts with cooperatives of all
sizes. In these deals, there are "discounts on the sale price" of up to 5%
of the normal price charged. 69 Additionally, Monsanto expanded its
65. Lei No. 10.711, de 5 de Agosto de 2003, Standards for the Planting and Marketing of
Soybeans Harvested, Sept. 2003 (Braz.).
66. Christopher Heath, The Scope of DNA Patents in the Light of the Recent Monsanto
Decisions, 40 INT'L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 940, 943 (2009).

67. Lei No. 11.105, de 24 de Marco de 2005, Biosafety Law, Marc. 2005 (Braz.).
68. Challenge the Process, supra note 6.
69. The cooperatives help in the inspection, demanding the gathering of values to the
firm on each bag sold. See Bianchini Cooperative S/A: Standard Agreement Between Monsanto
and Suppliers, Legal Entities, and Brokers (2010) (on file with author).
To all Our Suppliers, legal entities and relevant brokers (. . .) Considering that
we established a contract with the firm Monsanto, with in mind the commercial
licensing on soybean "Round Up Ready" and the correspondent payment of the
intellectual property rights (IPR), from which originates high tickets, we
require the attention and kindness, from now on and in case the merchandise
contains genetically modified organisms, when confirming soybean sells to do
it taking into account the following statements:
I) In the case of Participants:
"The salesperson declares that he enters the system of intellectual property
rights (IPR) of soybean Round Up Ready of Monsanto, in the category of
Participant."
II) In the case of Collaborators:
"C The salesperson declares that he enters the system of intellectual property
rights (IPR) of soybean Round Up Ready of Monsanto, in the category of
collaborators. Consequently, by doing so, he authorizes the buyer to deduct
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database with data from cooperative members.
In this scheme, firms benefit by receiving rates from the use of the
technology. Companies like Monsanto are free to fix rates as they wish,
and these rates have increased substantially over the past few years. The
initial value charged for the use of technology was fixed at R$1.20 per
bag of 60 kilos (2.20 bushels); but Monsanto, since the beginning, gave
a 50% "discount" to farmers. Back then, with the sack value on the
international market at R$45, this represented 1.3% of the seed price.
Nevertheless, with soybean's devaluation of the Brazilian Real in
relation to the American Dollar, there was a substantial increase of the
percentage charged. The discount died out. In 2005, for example,
Monsanto charged a value of R$1.20 per each sack of R$30.00, which
was about 3.75% of the seed price. This represented a charged amount
of approximately 80 million dollars only on the soybean production of
Rio Grande do Sul, where Monsanto especially concentrated its efforts
to gather charges for that year. 70
IX. THE LEGAL BATTLE AMONG EUROPEAN IMPORTERS, FARMERS,
AND MONSANTO: THE FALL LIKE A HOUSE OF CARDS

Because there are no instruments to verify the existence of the
modified gene on a grand scale, the collection of charges was done on
the entire cultivated crop without undergoing detection tests. Once
seeders and other cooperatives integrated Monsanto's "intellectual
property system," farmers ended up with no means to question the
system, with rare exceptions. One of these exceptions was the class
action suit brought by Cotricampo Cooperative, from Campo Novo, Rio
Grande do Sul, against Monsanto. 7 In the files, the cooperative argued
the illegality of royalty collection, the lack of existence of intellectual
property rights on the cultivated plant, the impossibility to charge the
produced grains according to the law in force, cartel formation with the
remaining firms, and the oligopoly represented by the considerable
market domination of Monsanto, Cargill, Bunge, and ADM. The
cooperative obtained a restraining order preventing the royalty
from the price that will be given by the payment of the merchandise R$0.60 by
bag of 60kg, to be passed again to Monsanto of Brazil, related to the payment
of the IPR."
Id. Challenge the Process, supra note 6. Cotricampo Cooperative gathers 8,721 farmers in 12
municipalities in Rio Grande do Sul summing a production in 2003 of 1,700,000 bags of
soybean.
70. Interview with the lawyers of Agricultural Cooperatives, in Campo Novo, Rio Grand
do Sul (Oct. 7, 2009).
71. Challenge the Process, supra note 6.
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collection, which was canceled by the Supreme Court of Justice.
Monsanto retaliated against the farmers who brought this matter to
justice by using incriminating statements made to Rio Grande do Sul's
Prosecutor, alleging an infraction of its intellectual property rights. 72
The prosecution even proposed a claim for a denunciation, which was
carried out by the judiciary. In an interesting sentence, the Company
and the parquet's allegation were not accepted by the magistrate, which
based its interpretation on the piled up theory in order to acquit the
farmers reasoning that it would not be possible to classify something
that the State stimulates as an infraction. In the absence of a judiciary
decision on the legality of the patents granted to Monsanto, the case
remained open. The state failed to exhibit its control and essentially
permitted the smuggling of genetically modified soybeans. The amnesty
given by the temporary measures of the Federal Government also
encouraged the crop. Consequently, one cannot talk of infraction, which
confirmed the trial of the Courthouse of the State of Rio Grande do
Sul. 74
This legal strategy, it would appear, started to collapse after the
European Courts' decisions, starting with Monsanto itself. Monsanto
started lawsuits against importers of soybeans from Argentina, based on
the European Regulation 1383/2003, in order to enforce its rights on
Argentinean traders. Monsanto requested the retention of the product in
European ports if they were not paid royalties on patented genes.
Importers of Argentine soy did not accept the proposal from Monsanto.
Monsanto then requested the retention of the goods at the customs ports
of Spain, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. However, after a
few years, these courts ruled in a restrictive interpretation against
Monsanto. Altogether, there were three different decisions with
different repercussions. In Spain, the Trade Court of Madrid ruled that
the European Regulation did not allow the extension of rights to
processed soybeans.75 In the United Kingdom, the Court not only
accepted the same argument as that in Spain, but also accepted the
argument of an importer, Cargill, that Monsanto stimulated the
contrafaction and thus could not invoke the violation of its patent
rights.7 6 In the Netherlands, the Court, facing a relevant doubt, sent the
case to the European Court of Justice. After a few years, on July 6,
2010, the European Court of Justice decided to uphold the restriction of
rights on Monsanto's rights, holding the imposters of products derived
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id
75. Case on Soybeans, Case 488/07, The Case on Soybeans and Monsanto, Decision of
July 27, 2007.
76. Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cargill Int'l SA [2007] EWHC (Pat.) 2257 (Eng.).
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from biotechnological inventions (such as soybeans) should not pay
royalties.n This decision became valid to the entire European territory.
Because exporters at the international level did not have to pay any
further royalties, the "house of cards" started to collapse. The leading
case was a class action suit filed on April 14, 2009. It is still under
judgment at the Court of Appeals of Rio Grande do Sul, but the
preliminary decisions are nevertheless noteworthy. The plaintiffs are
rural syndicates of Passo Fundo, Sertio, and Santiago. Passo Fundo is
the only city of average size, and Sertio and Santiago are villages with
few inhabitants. Yet these are traditional centers of soybean production.
During the lawsuit, more than 370 other syndicates or associations
joined the action.
The farmers asked for the following: a) to stop paying royalties to
Monsanto because they did not purchase any grains from it; b)
suspension of the payments during the trial because the payments could
be then used against them as a form of self-recognition of the rights of
Monsanto; c) judgment that the rights values were abusive and in
violation of the principle of the social function of property; d) judgment
that the Brazilian law prevents dual protection by both patents and the
UPOV system, and that the only system to obey was UPOV; e)
judgment that the patents were invalid.
Monsanto had the following arguments: a) it had several valid
patents on soybeans, according to the Brazilian Patent n.9.279/96
(following TRIPS); b) it had UPOV rights recognized by the Brazilian
Law 9.279/96. The INPI participated on the side of Monsanto and
argued that the patents were valid.
The judge first asked Monsanto to present the patents and all other
intellectual property rights that justified its claim. Monsanto proceeded
to present three patents. Then, the judge hired an expert to evaluate
those patents, UPOV rights, and all other information registered by
Monsanto in other countries that could be valid through the Unionist
system, such as the recognition of a U.S. pipeline patent.
The judge's conclusions at the trial were quite interesting:
a) With respect to the first patent (PI 11001067-3), it was a patent
assured by pipeline. The deposit date was the first one in the United
States. Thus, the validity expired on January 23, 2007. Monsanto
attempted to receive an extension with more litigation at different
courts, but after several attempts this was ultimately denied by the
Federal Justice.
b) The second patent (PI 11001045-2) also lost its validity on
January 13, 2007. Like the first one, it was the subject of several court
77.

C-428/08, Monsanto Tech. LLC v. Cefetra BV, 2010 E.C.R. 1-6790.
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cases, and it had similarly lost its validity in a final decision after many
years of litigation.
c) The third patent (PI 110008-3) lost its validity on August 31,
2010. This patent was subject to another trial extension, considered
impossible at first by the Federal Justice Federal of Rio de Janeiro on
April 4, 2011. Monsanto has appealed, and the judgment has not yet
been made by the Federal Justice (as of fall 2012). According to the
expert, among the patents submitted by Monsanto, the third patent
would be the only one to have a relationship with the patented soybeans.
The judge ruled that Monsanto had no rights because:
1) There is no suspensive effect in the appellation. Therefore, the
only possible patent was no longer valid.
2) The Brazilian law prevents dual protection, so the patent has no
effect on living matter (soybean seed).
The judge, therefore, held that Monsanto shall:
a) Return all that it acquired from farmers since the harvest of 2003
through 2004, plus 1%per month in interest, plus inflation.
b) Pay a daily penalty of 1 million Brazilian Reals (about $500,000)
for the suspension of the requirement of rights.
Finally, the judge acknowledged the existence of the farmers' right
to produce their own seeds regardless of the size of the farm.
As of fall 2012, the Court of Appeals of Rio Grande do Sul has not
judged the decision. However, the parties estimate the compensation
would be approximately $2-3 billion if confirmed. This would be the
last instance for this kind of process.
Indeed, the Brazilian law is very clear about the exclusive
applicability of the law instead of UPOV on seeds and the impossibility
of accumulation. Yet, the combination of the judiciary taking an
enormous amount of time to judge and its lack of knowledge on biotech
patent rights is an institutional weakness in Brazil that makes it even
more difficult to coordinate solutions.
Monsanto takes advantage of these institutional weaknesses by
getting pipeline patents. Monsanto also uses extensions at different
judicial fora in the federation and extensions of several patents to secure
these rights, although some patents had nothing to do with soy.
Sometimes, Monsanto demonstrated its rights with patents unrelated to
soybeans. For example, the judge made an explicit (and ironic) report
about a Brazilian jurist's opinion and added it to the process at
Monsanto's request and analyzed a patent that was not even under
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discussion. Given that this was a class action case, the judge had the
opportunity to require Monsanto to compensate all farmers in the
country, even those who were not part of the process.
X. CONCLUSIONS
The complexity of the patent legal system for biotechnology allows
companies to patent genes, even when countries expressly prohibit these
patents through their legislation. This is especially true in developing
countries where the patent offices are more fragile. In these types of
countries, even when a patent office denies patent demands, companies
can enforce patent rights by utilizing the judiciary. Because the time to
decide these lawsuits could take many years, in practice the judiciary
allows patent holders to exercise their monopoly for periods as long as
permitted under a regular patent.
The complexity of patent law also makes it difficult for other actors
involved in the production chain, regardless of whether or not there are
intellectual property rights over a plant and the limits of these patents.
The case study shows that Monsanto used patents not related to GM soy
nor valid in Brazil to convince Brazilian farmers and courts that it had
rights to control soy production.
Monsanto substantially increased its control on the Brazilian
production of soybeans through a series of agreements established
directly with farmers, as well as with trade barns and traders.79
Schematically, the increased control happened in two aspects: the
control of the production and sale of seeds by the acquisition of local
seed companies, and the control of intellectual property rights on
transgenic seeds produced by farmers.s 0 This control happened easily
due to the farmers' interests in this soybean, resistance to glyphosate,
and, in the Brazilian case, the farmers' beliefs that there were valid
patents that obligated them.
The soy planted in Brazil was not bought from Monsanto. This
genetically modified soybean was the result of the crossing done by
farmers between traditional Brazilian soybeans and Monsanto soybeans
imported illegally from Argentina.81 Since Brazil had temporarily
banned genetically modified crops at this time, Monsanto could not sell
its "soy resistant to glyphosate" in Brazil. However, even though their
sale was illegal, these beans were rapidly adopted at the main
78. Id.
79. In conducting this research, our team interviewed farmers in three different states
(Goias, Mato Grosso, and Parand) to collect information about agreements.
80. See Challenge the Process, supra note 6.
8 1. Id.
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production centers without any real control from public authorities.
Brazilian farmers imported the soybean, reproduced the seed in Brazil,
and started the cultivation in great scale, despite the prohibition.
Considering the amount of seeds used, it is believed that some of the
authorities who were in favor of the genetically modified soybean
willingly did not control its insertion in the market nor control its
cultivation and then, eventually, legalized it.
Monsanto's interest in effectively applying its rights of intellectual
property grew because Brazil had become the world's third largest
producer and the RR soybean was legalized. Once cultivation was
allowed, Monsanto, in collaboration with competing firms, used
contracts to assume control. Monsanto offered competitors the license
to use the gene of glyphosate resistance and to incorporate it into their
own soybean varieties. These firms could insert the gene of resistance
with the consent of the patent holder of the gene and could start to sell
genetically modified soybeans with Monsanto's technology. Because it
is a technology of high interest for the farmers, companies that
cooperated gained a share of the market, and, above all, would be able
to export legally.
However, the strategy was fragile because after many years, even in
a developing country like Brazil, the judiciary analytically discerned the
technically complex patent applications and noted their invalidity. The
result was a court decision with significant compensation damages
against Monsanto. This decision is one of the highest compensations
involving intellectual property rights in history.

